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1.  Introduction 
In this paper we analyze the direct effects of international remittances on child labor 
and schooling decisions of Mexican migrant households. We exploit the impact that the 
U.S. recession during 2008-2009 had on unemployment rates of Mexican immigrants and, 
thus, on remittance receipts of an important number of Mexican households, to identify 
whether these households responded to the decrease in remittances by taking their children 
out of school and sending them to work.  
Studying the impact of migration and of remittances on child labor and educational 
outcomes is challenging, as a consequence of the complexity of the relationships involved 
and of the estimation difficulties usually present in the analysis. Indeed, migration involves 
different effects on household decisions that may go in opposite directions. In particular, 
remittance receipts from family members working abroad could lead to higher school 
retention and lower child labor, especially if they relax liquidity constraints (Taylor, 1992; 
Taylor and Wyatt, 1996). This effect, however, may be offset by low perceived returns to 
education, given the job that children are expected to find in the U.S. if they are to migrate 
themselves in the future, or by the fact that migration may disrupt family life and, thus, 
have  negative effects on school attendance (Kandel and Kao, 2001; McKenzie and 
Rapoport, 2010; McKenzie and Sasin, 2007). Furthermore, if by relaxing credit constraints 
remittances lead households to start new family businesses, an increase of child labor may 
also be induced.  From  an  econometric  point of view, the  endogeneity  of  migration 
decisions complicates the analysis further. Indeed, both migration and child labor/schooling 
decisions could be simultaneously driven by community or household-level factors that 
may be unobservable to the researcher (see e.g. Durand and Massey, 1992; Durand et al., 
1996; Taylor et al., 1996).  
Several papers have studied the effect of migration and remittances on child labor 
and schooling in developing countries. There is evidence from Pakistan, El Salvador, and 
other Latin American economies that suggests that migration tends to reduce the incidence 
of child labor and to promote school retention (e.g. Cox Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Acosta, 
2006; Mansuri, 2006; Acosta, Fajnzylber and López, 2007). Most of these studies use 
cross-section data and analyze long-run effects of migration or remittances.  In contrast, 
Yang (2008), the most closely related paper to this one, studies the direct impact of 2 
 
remittances using a household panel data from the Philippines. The identification approach 
in that paper comes from the heterogeneous exchange rate shocks suffered by diverse 
countries hosting Philippine immigrants during the 1997 Asian crisis. As in the other 
studies, the main finding is that the probability of school attendance rises and child labor 
decreases as the value of remittances increases. 
In Mexico,  the  existing evidence on the relationship between migration and 
schooling is generally inconclusive and, in some cases, seems to contradict the results from 
other countries.  For instance, Hanson and Woodruff (2003) show that, after controlling for 
observable characteristics and instrumenting for migration, the effect of migration on child 
schooling in  rural communities is positive only for girls in households with relatively 
uneducated mothers. For boys, as well as for girls in households with more educated 
mothers, belonging to a migrant household does not seem to have an effect on schooling. 
Borraz (2005) suggests  that the  effects  found  for girls in households with relatively 
uneducated mothers  in the previously cited paper are only present in very small 
communities (population below 2,500). In contrast, he finds no significant effects in larger 
villages. Using a different sample, Boucher, Stark, and Taylor (2005) are also unable to 
identify  a  significant effect of migration on human capital formation in rural Mexico.  
Other studies tend to suggest the presence of negative effects of migration on schooling in 
Mexico’s rural communities (López-Córdoba, 2005; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010). None 
of these studies, however, looks for evidence concerning a possible effect of migration or 
remittances on child labor decisions. 
As opposed to the papers cited above, our estimation focuses only on the short term 
direct effect of remittances on household decisions, and not on the overall longer-run effect 
that migration could have on these choices. In particular, our contribution is related to the 
question of whether households that face a negative shock on their remittance flows sort 
out, in the short term, the reduction in income by increasing child labor or taking their 
children out of school. 
Our identification strategy relies on the fact that Mexican immigrants were strongly 
hit by the latest downturn of the U.S. economy. As may be seen in Figure 1, Mexican 
immigrant  unemployment rates increased significantly  after September 2008, when the 
recession started to become more pronounced and widespread across sectors. This shock 3 
 
caused some immigrants  to  stop sending remittances to their families in Mexico  or to 
reduce the dollar amount sent. Indeed, the U.S. dollar value of remittances received by 
Mexico decreased by a sharp 20% from the second quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 
2009 (see Figure 2). In this same period, the percentage of Mexican households receiving 
remittances fell from 4.3% to 3.4%.
1  In terms of their income level, a sudden stop in 
remittance receipts should translate into a  significant  negative  shock  for  migrant 
households, since on average 38% of their total income comes from international family 
transfers.
2
Formally, we use a differences-in-differences estimation approach,  where the 
treatment group is composed of 12 to 16 year old children as of 2008-II in households that 
received remittances in that quarter. The control group is formed by children of the same 
ages, but that belong to households that did not receive remittances in 2008-II (before the 
strongest effect of the crisis on immigrant unemployment rates) nor in 2009-I (close to the 
lowest point of the recession). To control for the possible endogeneity of the migration 
decision, we use distance to the U.S. border along the 1920 rail network as an instrument 
for the membership in the remittance-recipient group. The use of this instrument relies on 
the fact that the location of the 1920 rail lines determined the early sources of migrants in 
the Mexico-U.S. migration history. Mainly as a consequence of the formation of migrant 
networks, these locations continue to be relevant sources of migrants at present (Woodruff, 
2007). To eliminate biases that could arise from correlation between the 1920 rail lines and 
the current level of regional economic development, we control for education, health, and 
income levels at the municipality level in our estimations.  
 The large magnitude of this shock suggests that affected families may have 
reacted strongly in terms of child labor and school attendance decisions.  
As a brief preview of our results, we find that the shock on remittance-recipient 
households caused an increase in the probability that a child works of 9.8 percentage points, 
from a baseline level of 15.7 percent.  Moreover, it caused a decrease in school attendance 
                                                            
1 These figures come from the Mexican National Occupation and Employment Survey (ENOE) conducted by 
INEGI in a representative sample of Mexican households. This is the database we use in this paper. 
2 This figure is computed using data from the 2008 INEGI’s Income and Expenditures Household Survey 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, 2008). 4 
 
of 15.6 percentage points, from a baseline of 82.2 percent. We find that these effects are 
fundamentally driven by the behavior of migrant households in rural communities.
3
Our results could shed light on the role that remittances may have to relax credit 
constraints. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz  (2009), in an empirical study for 100 countries, 
found evidence that remittances are an alternative means to finance investment and help 
overcoming liquidity constraints. Hanson and Woodruff (2003) and Woodruff and Zenteno 
(2007) have also emphasized the role that remittances may have in this sense. Here, we 
show that households that experiment a disruption in remittance flows seem to be forced to 
take their children out of school to work.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data we use for 
the analysis. Section 3 presents some descriptive statistics.  Section 4 describes the 
identification strategy and the results.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Data  
The data we use comes from the Mexican National Occupation and Employment 
Survey for 2008 and 2009 (Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo; ENOE) conducted 
by  Mexico’s  National Statistics Institute INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadística  y 
Geografía). This is a quarterly household survey with a rotating panel structure. Every 
quarter, one fifth of the sample is dropped and a new fifth added, so that each household is 
followed for five consecutive quarters. The purpose of the survey is to collect data on the 
employment situation of Mexicans 12 years of age or older in rural and urban areas. The 
survey has a basic and an extended questionnaire. The extended questionnaire is usually 
applied  only once a year.  This extended questionnaire contains a series of additional 
questions over the basic version, including whether the household receives international 
remittances.  Unfortunately, no information on the value of resources received from this 
source is collected.  
The extended questionnaire is normally applied in the second quarter of each year. 
However, in the period we study INEGI chose an unusual timing to apply it. In particular, 
                                                            
3 Another adjustment mechanism that households could have when faced with a recession such as the one 
observed in 2008-2009 could be the return of the immigrant to Mexico. Passel and Cohn (2009) and Cornelius 
et al. (2009), however, find that the recent crisis did not cause an increase in return migration of Mexican 
immigrants in the U.S. This may reflect the presence of migration costs and may also suggest that migrants 
may have perceived the 2008-2009 shock as temporary in terms of its effects on immigrant unemployment. 5 
 
while in 2008 the extended questionnaire was indeed applied in the second quarter, this 
questionnaire was again applied in the first quarter of 2009. This was especially helpful for 
our analysis for two reasons.  First, we obtained the relevant information we needed for 
each household for both 2008-II, a point before the large increase in Mexican immigrant 
unemployment rates was observed  and when remittances reached a maximum, and for 
2009-I, when the deepest phase of the recession was taking place, immigrant 
unemployment was already high and remittances were at their lowest point (see Figures 1 
and 2). Second, the early application of the extended questionnaire in 2009 allowed us to 
obtain information for that year on two fifths of the 2008-II sample (instead of on only one 
fifth). This effectively increased by two the sample size we could use for the analysis.  
In relation to the sample we use, the 2008-II ENOE reports information for 315,876 
persons 12 years of age or older living in 106,170 households. We restrict our sample to 
those households in their first and second interview in 2008-II, since these are the ones we 
can observe again in 2009-I (given the five quarters panel structure of the survey).  We 
focus on children aged 12 to 16 in the 2008-II wave. We are able to identify 658 children in 
remittance recipient households in 2008-II  that we can follow across the two survey 
waves.
4
A possible concern with the use of this survey, as is the case with most panel data 
surveys, is attrition. Our results could be biased if attrition is correlated with some variables 
that also affect our outcome variables.  Although we cannot directly test for this, we find 
that attrition among children belonging to households receiving remittances in 2008-II is 
around 13 percent, which may be considered to be within a reasonable range and turned out 
not to be statistically different from  attrition of children in non-remittance recipient 
households. Attrition among all respondents is 16%, and attrition at the household level is 
around 12%. However, we do observe that attrition is higher for children who work (16%, 
as compared to 13% for those who do not work).  If it is the case that children in 
households that were affected by a decrease in remittances are more likely to work and 
leave the sample for this reason, then our estimates could be downward biased.   
  For the control group, we identify 13,950 children in households that did not 
receive remittances in any of the two periods.   
 
                                                            
4 A household is considered to be receiving remittances if at least one member (12 years of age or older)  
reported receiving economic aid from someone abroad in 2008-II. 6 
 
3.  Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 1 we present the main characteristics of children aged 12 to 16 in 2008-II 
and  of their corresponding  households.  We show results for two  groups:  Children in 
households  that did not receive remittances in 2008-II nor in 2009-I  (column a)  and 
children in all households that received remittances in 2008-II (column b). The left panel 
contains information for the overall sample.  We observe that children in the never-
recipient group are equally likely to work than those belonging to recipient households, but 
are significantly more likely to attend school. There are no significant differences between 
these groups in terms of their mean age or gender. However, there are important differences 
related to household characteristics across groups. First, non-recipient households have a 
higher labor income.
5 Furthermore, in this group the household head is less likely to be 
female, is on average more educated, younger, and more likely to be married.  Moreover, 
remittance recipient households, when compared to non-recipients, are more likely to be 
located in small rural villages (under 2,500 inhabitants) and to live in a municipality with 
lower health, education, and income indexes.
6
The  right  panel  of Table 1  presents results  restricting  the sample to rural 
households, defined as those located in towns with population under 15,000.  Note that 
rural children are more likely to work, when compared to the overall sample.  In the rural 
sample, never-recipients are also more likely to attend school than remittance recipients. 
The differences on household characteristics mentioned for the whole sample go in the 
same direction for the rural sample.  
  
 
4.  Estimation of the effects of a negative shock on remittances 
In this section we implement a differences-in-differences (DiD) approach to explore 
the effect of a negative shock on remittance receipts on child labor and school attendance.
7
                                                            
5 A higher labor income does not necessarily mean that these households are richer.  The survey we use does 
not capture other types of non-labor income nor the value of household assets.   
  
With this purpose, we define a treatment group composed of children aged 12 to 16 whose 
households received remittances in 2008-II and a control group formed by children from  
6 These indexes are used to construct the human development index published by the UNDP. 
7 A person is considered to be working if in the week previous to the survey he or she participated in some 
type of economic activity (production of goods or services) for at least one hour, with or without pay; or if he 
or she has a job but worked for zero hours for being in a vacation or sickness period. 7 
 
households that did not receive remittances in 2008-II nor in 2009-I (never-recipients).  The 
DiD estimator will capture the differential effect of the crisis on children from remittance 
recipient households relative to children in non-recipient households.  While we do not 
observe the value of remittances received by each household, we do observe that 63% of 
the children in our sample in households receiving remittances in 2008-II saw this source of 
income totally interrupted by 2009-I.  Furthermore, given the negative impact of the U.S. 
recession on employment levels of Mexican immigrants (Figure 1), it seems natural to 
expect  that some households still receiving remittances by 2009-I may have faced a 
reduction in their value.
8
The simple DiD procedure yields an unbiased estimate of the change in child labor 
and school attendance due to a negative shock on remittance receipts if both treatment and 
control groups reacted to the crisis in the same way, except for the behavior associated to 
the change in remittances. We acknowledge, however,  that this assumption may fail if 
recipients are different from non-recipients on some unobservable variables;  that is, if 
households are selected into migration.  Therefore, as will be explained below, we 
implement an instrumental variables estimation to address this concern.  
   
 
4.1. Differences-in-differences estimates 
Table 2 presents the mean values of the outcome variables (child labor and school 
attendance) for both the control and treatment groups in the 2008-II and 2009-I waves.  The 
DiD estimator is equal to the difference across waves of the difference between treatment 
and control groups. Taking the difference between the two waves for the treatment group 
gives us an estimate of the effect of remittances on the outcome variables plus the effect of 
any other seasonal or non-seasonal shock that affects the outcomes of both groups, such as 
the economic crisis or a time trend. The difference between waves for the control group 
provides an estimate of such additional non-remittance related  factors.  Therefore, 
differencing the estimate across waves for the treatment group with that of the control 
group should offer an estimate of the effect of remittances.  
                                                            
8 Some remittance recipient households may have benefitted from the peso depreciation during the crisis. This 
could have increased the value of their remittance receipts in pesos, even if they decreased in dollar terms.  
Clearly, this effect could bias our results towards zero. 8 
 
At baseline, 14.6% of children in the control group were working. The figure for the 
treatment group is 15.7%. Between the two waves, both groups increased their level of 
child labor:  The control group by 1.6 percentage points and the treatment group by 3.5 
percentage points.  The  simple  DiD estimator is equal to 1.9  percentage points  (not 
statistically significant). This would seem to suggest that on average there was no reaction 
in terms of child labor to the effect of the crisis on remittances.  School attendance for the 
treatment and control groups, and the associated DiD estimation, are also presented in 
Table 2.  There was a reduction in this indicator for both groups, and the decrease was 
larger for the treatment group. However, the DiD estimate again suggests that the additional 
reduction due to the change in remittances is not statistically significant. 
We next include child and household characteristics in the estimation, in order to 
control for observable variables that could affect our outcomes of interest. We therefore 
estimate the following equation: 
 
yit= α + β Remiti + γ Crisist + δ Remiti·Crisist + φ Xi + εit
where Remit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the child belongs to a 
household that received remittances in 2008-II  (treatment group)  and zero if the child 
belongs to a household that did not receive remittances in 2008-II nor in 2009-I (control 
group); Crisis is a dummy that takes the value of one for 2009-I and zero for 2008-II; and 
Remit·Crisis is the interaction of the previous two dummies. In this context, the coefficient 
δ yields the DiD estimator. X
      (1) 
i is a series of control variables related to child and household 
level characteristics measured at 2008-II. The controls we include are the gender and age of 
the child, a dummy for villages with population under 2,500 persons, the number of 
household members, the number of household members under 18 years of age and under 5 
years of age, and several characteristics of the household head (gender, years of schooling, 
age, and a dummy to identify whether he/she is married).  For some specifications we also 
include total household labor income at baseline, excluding the child’s if she works.
9
                                                            
9 Household labor income may be an important determinant of whether a child is sent to work or taken out of 
school when facing a negative shock in remittance receipts, and therefore could be an important control.  
However, although we consider the value at baseline (not affected by the crisis), including it in the regression 
may cause some endogeneity problems.  We therefore present estimates with and without this control.  
   9 
 
As before, we study two outcome variables, labeled as yit
The results  of estimating Equation (1) with OLS  are presented in  Table 3.  We 
propose  three  different specifications,  each of which includes additional controls with 
respect to the previous.  On the left hand side panel we present the DiD estimates of the 
effect of remittances on the probability that the child works.  The first column corresponds 
to the case without controls and, therefore, the coefficient is the same as the one reported in 
Table 2.
 in Equation (1):  Child 
labor and school attendance. We have two observations (t=2008-II and t=2009-I) for each 
child i (aged 12 to 16). Note that, since child labor and school attendance are measured as 
dummy variables, Equation (1) corresponds to a Linear Probability Model for these two 
outcomes.   
10  We obtain a coefficient of 0.02, not statistically significant under any of the 





4.2. Instrumental variables specification  
As mentioned above, our previous identification strategy relies on the assumption 
that the control and treatment groups behaved similarly in response to common shocks that 
took place between 2008-I and 2009-II.  It is likely that there is selection into migration, 
which implies that families with and without international migrants are not alike in terms of 
unobservables and may have therefore reacted differently to non-remittance related shocks 
during the period we analyze. If migrants, for example, care more about keeping children in 
school (given a school attainment objective) or if they have a higher discount factor, they 
will have a lower propensity to take their children out of school in case of a reduction in 
labor income, and our estimates would be biased downward.  Another situation in which 
the linear probability estimates are downward biased arises if migrants particularly dislike 
child labor. To deal with biases from the possible endogeneity of migration, we instrument 
                                                            
10 Standard errors in the estimation of Equation (1) are clustered at the household level and may therefore 
differ from those in Table 2. 
11 The coefficients on some of the control variables show patterns that seem to be consistent with prior 
expectations. For example, children are more likely to start working during the period of reference if they are 
male.  Also, the probability of working increases with age and is higher for small villages (population under 
2,500). Gender, age, and being located in a small village also enter significantly in the schooling regressions, 
but with negative signs.  Additionally, the economic crisis seems to have had an overall negative effect on 
school attendance. 10 
 
for the membership to the remittance recipient group, which is represented by Remit in 
Equation (1). 
Our instrumental variables approach relies on the facts that early migration flows 
were closely associated to the then existent rail lines, and that current sources of migration 
are highly correlated with the original ones.  At the early stages of the Mexico-U.S. 
migration history, during the first half of the Twentieth Century, Mexicans were recruited 
to work in the U.S., and the recruitment process and journey to the north took place along 
the rail line (see Massey et al., 2002; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007).  Two temporary guest 
worker programs played an especially important role in reinforcing this route of migration 
and in promoting the creation of migrant networks.  The first Bracero program started in 
1917 and the second in 1942, both with the aim of alleviating the shortage of workers in the 
U.S. as a consequence of World Wars I and II, respectively (Martin, 1998). As a result, the 
1920 rail network determined the location of the original sources of migration. In  this 
context, it turns out that regional migration rates have shown highly persistent patterns. 
Indeed, locations that were important sources of Mexican migrants at the early stages of the 
Mexico-U.S. migration history continue to be so at present  (Woodruff, 2007). Migrant 
networks may play an important role in this persistence, by lowering the migration costs of 
individuals  located  in regions with high historical emigration rates (Munshi, 2003; 
McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007). As a consequence of the above, variables measuring past 
migration rates or the determinants of historical migration flows may  serve as good 
instruments for current migration flows or remittance receipts.  
Several authors  in the Mexico-U.S.  migration literature have exploited  these 
insights to construct relevant instrumental variables to control for the possible endogeneity 
of migration. For example, McKenzie and Rapoport (2010), Hanson and Woodruff (2003) 
and Borraz (2005) use the historic state-level migration rates as an instrument for current 
migration.  Other authors, such as Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) and Demirgüç -Kunt et al. 
(2010), have exploited the link between current migration and the placement of the 1920 
rail lines.  We  implement  the latter  strategy,  following  closely Demirgüç -Kunt et al. 
(2010). In particular, to construct our instrument we  use the distance from  each 
municipality to the rail network as it existed in 1920 plus the distance along the railroad 
from that point to the U.S. border, adjusted by relative travel costs between rail and land 11 
 
transportation.  Following Coatsworth (1972), these authors argue that costs of rail travel 
were one-third to one-sixth as much as those for land transportation and, therefore, they 
estimate that the distance from the municipality to the rail should be multiplied by five 
before being added to the distance along the rail network to the border, to obtain a total 
distance from a municipality to the U.S.  For migrants near the border and far from the 
railroad the direct distance from their municipality to the U.S. may be the relevant one.  
Given these arguments, the instrumental variable we use is the minimum between (1) five 
times the distance from the municipality to the rail network as it existed in 1920 plus the 
distance from that point to the border with the U.S. and (2) the direct distance from the 
municipality to the border.  The variable is labeled Distance and is expressed in hundreds 
of kilometers.   
Apart from being correlated with remittance receipts, the instrument should meet 
the exclusion restriction. This is, it should not be correlated with child labor or school 
attendance,  except through its  effect  on  remittances.  A possible concern is correlation 
between distance in 1920 (as defined above) and the current level of development of the 
municipality. Indeed, municipalities close to the rail network could have developed faster, 
and current development levels in turn could have an impact on the incidence of child labor 
or on school attendance.  To address this possible concern, we control for recent levels of 
development at the municipality level using the education, health, and income indexes that 
compose the human development index estimated by the UNDP for 2005 (see PNUD, 
2009).  These indicators have the advantage of reflecting long term development and 
therefore are less likely to affect short run decisions on child labor and schooling.  
Moreover, they are not contemporaneous to the period we are focusing on. 
For the econometric estimation of Equation (1) we take into account the fact that the 
endogenous variable Remit  is binary.  Therefore, the procedure we implement has the 
following stages: We first estimate a probit model of the endogenous variable Remit, on the 
Distance variable and on the control variables (X).  We then obtain the fitted probabilities, 
which we call Remit-hat.  Finally, we estimate Equation (1) by 2SLS using Remit-hat as an 
instrument for  Remit  and  the interaction Remit-hat·Crisis  as an instrument for  the 
interaction term Remit·Crisis.  This yields a just-identified system.  This procedure does not 12 
 
require the probit stage to be correctly specified and the usual 2SLS standard errors and test 
statistics are asymptotically valid (see Procedure 18.1 in Wooldridge, 2001).   
The first panel of Table 4 presents the results of the probit model for different 
choices of additional controls. As expected, the coefficient of Distance suggests a negative 
and significant relationship between this variable and Remit, indicating that the further 
away from the U.S. border along the 1920 railway, the lower the probability of receiving 
remittances.  The table also presents the first stage results from the 2SLS estimation.  Our 
equation  includes two right hand side endogenous  variables (Remit  and the interaction 
Remit·Crisis). We therefore report results for the first stage associated to the endogenous 
variable Remit as well as for the first stage of the interaction Remit·Crisis in the second and 
third panels of the table, respectively. The coefficients of Remit-hat from the first stage of 
Remit  and  of  Remit-hat·Crisis  from the first stage of Remit·Crisis  are  statistically 
significant and have the correct sign  in both cases.  The F statistics of the first stage 
regressions seem to be sufficiently high (above 10) and the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic for 
weak identification exceeds the Stock and Yogo critical values, so we reject the null that 
the instrument is weak.
12
The results from the instrumental variables estimation are presented in Table 5. We 
find a large and significant effect of remittances on the incidence of child labor.  When we 
do not control for household labor income (excluding the child’s if she works) nor 
development indexes, the increase in the probability of child labor as a response to a 
decrease in remittances is of 11.4 percentage points (column 1).  This estimate decreases to 
9.8 percentage points when all the additional controls are included (column 4).
 
13
                                                            
12 Kleibergen-Paap F statistics are estimated using the ivreg29 routine for Stata (Baum et al., 2010), which 
also reports the Stock and Yogo critical values. 
  With 
respect to school attendance, we find a large and significant reduction in the probability that 
the child goes to school as a consequence of the remittances shortage. Without household 
income and development measures as controls, the effect of the shortage of remittances is 
13 Results do not show important differences if only the education and health controls are included and not the 
income index.  Additionally, including only per capita income (ppp adjusted, also published by UNDP) does 
not affect the results. 13 
 
estimated to be of 15.4 percentage points.  The results remain mostly unchanged once those 
controls are included.
14
Given that in Mexico child labor seems to be especially prevalent in rural 
communities, where migration rates to the U.S. also tend to be high, and that an important 
number of studies about migration has focused on rural areas, it may be useful to assess to 
what extent our results are driven by the behavior of rural households.  With that purpose, 
we performed the instrumental variables estimation procedure for two subsamples: i) 
children living in villages with a population under 15,000 persons (rural subsample); and ii) 
children in towns with a population of 15,000 persons or more (urban subsample).
 
15 Results 
from the probit and the first stage regressions indicate that the instrument is still valid.
16
                                                            
14 These IV coefficients are substantially larger than those from the OLS estimation.  The IV estimation 
corrects not only for omitted variable bias, but also for a possible measurement error problem in the right 
hand side endogenous variable, which would lead to an attenuation bias in OLS estimates  (Angrist and 
Krueger, 1999).  
 As 
may be noted in Table 6, the effect of remittances on child labor we found before is indeed 
driven by households in rural communities. In particular, the estimates suggest that, in the 
rural environment, the interruption of remittances had a significant effect on child labor 
(12.3 percentage points in the estimation with all controls). In contrast, the estimates for 
child labor in urban environments turned out to be statistically insignificant. As for the 
impact on school attendance, we find a significant effect for the rural sample, and a large 
but not statistically significant effect for the urban sample.  Possible reasons why these 
effects may be more apparent in the rural environment are: i) rural households may find it 
easier to send children to work, since productive land is generally accessible nearby; or, ii) 
rural households are more credit constrained than urban households. This last possibility is 
consistent with alternative evidence. Indeed, according to data from the Mexican Family 
15 The number of observations is the following.  For the full sample, 13,950 in the control group and 658 in 
the treatment group.  For the rural sample, 4,651 in the control group and 377 in the treatment group.  For the 
urban sample, 9,299 in the control group and 281 in the treatment group.  Each child appears twice in each 
regression, once for each survey wave. 
16 For the rural sample with all controls (including household labor income not considering the child's if she 
works and the development index components), the coefficient on Distance from the probit estimation is 
 -0.0098*** (0.002).  From the first stage of Remit, the coefficient on Remit-hat is 1.39** (0.144), and the F 
statistic is 46.6. From the first stage of Remit·Crisis, the coefficient on Remit-hat·Crisis is 1.1*** (0.079), and 
the F statistic is 98.41.  The Kleibergen-Paap F statistic for weak identification is equal to 46.51.  The number 
of observations is 10,056.  For the urban sample, also including all controls, the results are as follows: The 
coefficient on Distance from the probit estimation is -0.0119***(0.002); from the first stage of Remit, the 
coefficient on Remit-hat is 1.374***(0.224), and the F statistic is 19.1; from the first stage of Remit·Crisis, the 
coefficient on Remit-hat·Crisis  is  1.089*** (0.118), and the F statistic is  46.18; the Kleibergen-Paap F 
statistic for weak identification is equal to 18.73.  For this sample the number of observations is 19,160. 14 
 
Life Survey 2005 (Rubalcava and Teruel, 2008), only 7.4% of rural migrant households 




5.  Conclusions 
Previous papers in the literature have tried to identify the long term effects of migration 
and remittances  on schooling  in Mexican households and, in many cases, have found 
results that suggest a negligible or,  in some cases, a  negative effect. In this paper we 
focused on the short term effects of remittances on both school attendance and child labor, 
isolating our estimation from other type of longer-run effects that migration could have on 
these household choices. We used the 2008-2009 global economic crisis as an exogenous 
event that had a negative impact on remittance flows from the U.S. to Mexico to identify 
whether recipients react to this negative shock by increasing child labor or taking children 
out of school. The methodology consisted of a differences-in-differences strategy, where 
the  treatment group was composed of children (aged 12 to 16) in remittance recipient 
households at the beginning of 2008.  The control group was composed of children from 
never-recipient households. To account for possible endogeneity biases, we instrument for 
belonging to the treatment group with the distance from their municipality to the U.S. 
border along the 1920’s rail network.  We found that the negative shock on remittances 
caused an important increase in child labor and a decrease in school attendance of a similar 
magnitude.  
A possible interpretation of our findings is that remittance-recipient households are 
credit constrained, since they seem to face the negative shock on remittances by sending 
their children to work.  We leave for future research the task of conducting a more 
structural approach to identify whether the effects we found in this paper are related, for 
example, with the level of financial depth (bancarization) in the locality where households 
live, and whether migrant households are truly credit constrained. The results from that 
research could be relevant from a policy point of view. 
                                                            
17 A household is considered to have access to formal credit in this survey if at least one household member 
has a credit card or has ever received a loan from a bank or a non-bank financial institution (“caja de ahorro”).  15 
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Characteristics of children aged 12 to 16 and of their households in 2008-II 










(a) (b) (c) (d)
Child characteristics
Works (%) 14.6 15.7 -1.1 20.1 17.0 3.1
Attends school (%) 87.7 82.2 5.4 *** 83.2 78.0 5.2 ***
Male (%) 51.5 50.3 1.2 52.4 49.9 2.5
Age (years) 14.0 14.0 0.0 13.9 14.0 -0.1
Household characteristics
Number of household members 5.3 5.2 0.1 * 5.8 5.4 0.4 ***
Number of household members under 18 2.8 3.0 -0.2 *** 3.3 3.2 0.0
Number of household members under 5 5.1 5.0 0.1 5.5 5.1 0.4 ***
Female household head (%) 18.3 55.2 -36.8 *** 13.9 51.7 -37.8 ***
Schooling of household head (years) 7.5 3.8 3.8 *** 5.4 2.6 2.8 ***
Age of household head (years) 45.1 47.1 -1.9 *** 45.2 47.2 -2.1 ***
Married household head (%) 83.8 78.0 5.8 *** 88.1 82.2 5.9 ***
Total household labor income
 ('000 pesos) 7.5 4.0 3.5 *** 5.0 2.3 2.7 ***
Per capita household labor income
 ('000 pesos) 1.5 0.8 0.8 *** 0.9 0.4 0.5 ***
Adjusted total household labor income 
('000 pesos) 
a 7.4 3.8 3.5 *** 4.8 2.2 2.7 ***
Characteristics of municipality or locality
Locality under 2,500 inhabs. (%) 20.0 41.2 -21.2 *** 59.9 71.9 -11.9 ***
Rural (under 15,000) (%) 33.3 57.3 -24.0 *** 100.0 100.0 0.0
Distance to border 1920 ('00 km) 
b 12.6 11.9 0.7 14.7 13.4 1.3 **
Health index
c 0.90 0.87 0.03 *** 0.84 0.84 0.01
Education index
c 0.84 0.81 0.03 *** 0.80 0.78 0.01 ***
Income index
c 0.77 0.73 0.03 *** 0.70 0.69 0.01 **
Per capita annual income (ppp dollars) 10,916 9,077 1,839 *** 7,275 6,713 562 ***
Observations 13,950 658 4,651 377





Sample:  Children 12 to 16 years of age in the 2008-II wave of ENOE.  Non-recipients includes households that did not receive remittances in 2008-II nor in 
2009-I.  Rural households are located in villages with a population smaller than 15,000. 
a Excludes the child's labor income if she works. 
b Minimum distance between five times the distance from the municipality to the rail network as it existed in 1920 plus the distance from that point to the 
border with the U.S. and the direct distance from the municipality to the border. 
c
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




Simple Differences-in-differences estimations 
Outcome variable:  child labor Outcome variable:  school attendance
2008-II 2009-I Dif 2008-II 2009-I Dif
Control 0.146 0.162 0.016*** Control 0.877 0.839 -0.037***
(0.004) (0.004)
Treatment 0.157 0.191 0.035* Treatment 0.822 0.771 -0.052**
(0.021) (0.022)
Dif 0.0106 0.029** 0.019 Dif -0.054*** -0.069*** -0.014
(0.020) (0.020)
 
Note:  The treatment group is composed of children aged 12 to 16 in 2008-II that belong to households that declared receiving 
remittances in 2008-II.  The control group is composed of children aged 12 to 16 in 2008-II in households that did not receive 
remittances  in 2008-II  nor  in  2009-I.  Number of children:  658  for the treatment group  and  13,950  for the control group.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 







DiD results for child labor and school attendance 
Dep. Var.: Child Labor Dep. Var.: School attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.018*** -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.039***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Remit 0.0106 -0.023 -0.024 -0.0544*** -0.001 -0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Remit · Crisis 0.019 0.02 0.02 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Male 0.126*** 0.126*** -0.029*** -0.029***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 0.056*** 0.056*** -0.069*** -0.069***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Locality with under 2,500 inhabs. 0.057*** 0.055*** -0.042*** -0.043***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Number of household members -0.011** -0.01** -0.009* -0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of members under 18 0.024*** 0.023*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of members under 5 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Female household head -0.029*** -0.029*** 0.024** 0.024**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Schooling of household head -0.008*** -0.007*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age of household head -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married household head -0.019* -0.018* 0.047*** 0.047***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Adjusted household labor income -0.0006* -0.0003
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.146*** -0.619*** -0.62*** 0.877*** 1.718*** 1.717***
(0.003) (0.030) (0.030) (0.003) (0.033) (0.033)
Observations 29,216 29,216 29,216 29,216 29,216 29,216
R-squared 0.001 0.102 0.102 0.004 0.141 0.141  
 Sample: Children aged 12 to 16 in 2008-II. The Table presents the Linear Probability estimation of Equation (1). Remit is a dummy 
equal to one if the child belongs to a household that in 2008-II declared receiving remittances (treatment group), and it is equal to zero if 
the child belongs to a household that did not receive remittances in 2008-II nor in 2009-I (control group). Crisis is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one for 2009-I and zero for 2008-II. The coefficient on interaction term Remit ·Crisis is the DiD estimate of the impact 
on the outcome variables (child labor and school attendance) of the negative shock on remittances due to the 2008 economic crisis. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 






Instrumental variables estimation 
Dep. Var.: Child Labor Dep. Var.: School attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.033***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Remit -0.344*** -0.318*** -0.373*** -0.349*** 0.015 0.028 0.008 0.016
(0.069) (0.064) (0.071) (0.067) (0.074) (0.069) (0.074) (0.070)
Remit·Crisis 0.114** 0.111** 0.0995** 0.098** -0.154*** -0.142*** -0.167*** -0.156***
(0.051) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044) (0.042)
Male 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.125*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.029*** -0.029***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.069***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Locality with under 2,500 inhabs. 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.056*** 0.054*** -0.04*** -0.041*** -0.032*** -0.033***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Number of household members -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.009* -0.008 -0.01* -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of members under 18 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.024*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of members under 5 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Female household head 0.019 0.015 0.026* 0.022 0.034** 0.03** 0.036** 0.033**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Schooling of household head -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age of household head -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married household head 0.017 0.014 0.02 0.017 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.056*** 0.055***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Adjusted household labor income -0.0007** -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Health index 0.278*** 0.272*** 0.038 0.0338
(0.096) (0.095) (0.099) (0.099)
Education index -0.621*** -0.616*** 0.401*** 0.404***
(0.095) (0.095) (0.108) (0.108)
Income index -0.041 -0.0319 -0.205*** -0.197***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.069) (0.069)
Constant -0.646*** -0.645*** -0.347*** -0.352*** 1.709*** 1.711*** 1.493*** 1.489***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.061) (0.061) (0.034) (0.034) (0.068) (0.068)
Observations 29,216 29,216 29,216 29,216 29,216 29,216 29,216 29,216  
Note:  Second stage instrumental variables estimations of Equation (1).  First stage results presented in  Table 4.  The 
coefficients on the interaction term Remit·Crisis indicate the effect of the negative shock on remittances on the variables of 
interest (child labor and school attendance).  Remit is a dummy equal to one if the child belongs to a household that in 2008-II 
declared receiving remittances (treatment group), and it is equal to zero if the child belongs to a household that did not receive 
remittances in 2008-II nor in 2009-I (control group).  Crisis is a dummy variable that takes the value one for 2009-I and zero 
for 2008-II. The education, health, and income index correspond to the components of the UNDP Human Development Index.   
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  









Instrumental variables estimation for rural and urban samples  
Coefficients on the interaction term Remit·Crisis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full Sample 0.114** 0.111** 0.0995** 0.098** -0.154*** -0.142*** -0.167*** -0.156***
(0.051) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044) (0.042)
Rural Sample 0.141** 0.122** 0.134** 0.123** -0.085* -0.069 -0.096* -0.079
(0.061) (0.056) (0.060) (0.056) (0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.049)
Urban Sample -0.008 -0.009 -0.018 -0.021 -0.124 -0.114 -0.124 -0.115
(0.101) (0.100) (0.096) (0.096) (0.083) (0.081) (0.078) (0.076)
Additional controls
Adjusted household labor income No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Development indexes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
19,160





Note:  Second stage instrumental variables estimations of Equation (1).  First stage results reported in footnote 16. The 
coefficients reported correspond to those on the interaction term Remit·Crisis and indicate the effect of the negative shock on 
remittances on the variables of interest (child labor and school attendance).  Remit is a dummy equal to one if the child 
belongs to a household that in 2008-II declared receiving remittances (treatment group), and it is equal to zero if the child 
belongs to a household that did not receive remittances in 2008-II nor in 2009-I (control group).  Crisis is a dummy variable 
that takes the value one for 2009-I and zero for 2008-II.  The control variables included in all estimations are:  Gender and age 
of the child, a dummy for villages with population under 2,500 persons, the number of household members, the number of 
household members under 18 years of age and under 5 years of age, and several characteristics of the household head (gender, 
years of schooling, age, and a dummy to identify whether he/she is married). Additionally, estimations 2, 4, 6, and 8 include 
household labor income excluding that of the child if she works. Development indexes indicates whether the education, 
health, and income indexes to construct the UNDP human development index have been included as controls or not.  The 
rural sample is composed of children living in localities with a population of under 15,000 persons, while the urban sample 
considers children in localities above such threshold. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 















Apr Jul Oct Jan 
2007
Apr Jul Oct Jan 
2008
Apr Jul Oct Jan 
2009
Apr Jul Oct Jan 
2010





Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The shaded areas correspond to the second quarter of 2008 and to the 
first of 2009, which are the periods we use for the differences-in-differences approach we conduct in the 
paper. 




Quarterly remittances from the U.S. to Mexico 












I                 
2008




Source: Banco de México.  The shaded areas correspond to the second quarter of 2008 and to the first of 
2009, which are the periods we use for the differences-in-differences approach we conduct in the paper. 